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INTRODUCTION
When the news broke that Ron Fouchier
and his research team at Erasmus Med-
ical Center (MC) in the Netherlands had
genetically modified the highly pathogenic
avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus and
that it had acquired the ability to trans-
mit between mammals, it was a story of
scientific discovery and progress and an
exciting new development in the interna-
tional effort to prevent the next pandemic.
However, public anxieties and national
security concerns would soon become a
point of contention between virologists
and biosecurity experts in the media and
in highly politicized discussions about
science-policy. In considering the contro-
versy and the conflicts between scien-
tists and policy-makers, we propose that
regarding the situation as a principal–
agent problem can yield useful analytical
results.
Principal–agent problems occur when
two parties that are driven by compet-
ing self-interest negotiate the terms of a
relationship or contract and act together
toward a mutually defined end but an infor-
mational asymmetry provides one party
(typically the agent) with certain advan-
tages, thus creating tensions. Principal–
agent theory provides a template of rela-
tional action and the conditional effects of
actions in contract situations defined by a
functional differentiation, such as between
scientists and the government (on behalf
of its citizens). Exploring the science-
policy nexus from this perspective may
further efforts to develop effective poli-
cies that address dual-use concerns in the
life sciences by offering insights into meth-
ods of dispute resolution and the effective
design of institutional mechanisms that
balance the interests of the parties involved
thereby level the playing field.
A PRINCIPAL–AGENT PROBLEM?
Drawing from traditional tools of eco-
nomic analysis and the theory of rational
actors, principal–agent models provide a
useful heuristic to explore the behavior of
actors and intuitions engaged in contrac-
tual relations when there is informational
asymmetry and incompletely overlapping
or opposing goals. Based on the assump-
tion that the principal requires an agent
with a specific skill-set to perform spe-
cific actions or functions and both actors
enter an agreement to further their inter-
ests, the relationship is based on a division
of labor. The problem is one of delega-
tion. With imperfect or incomplete infor-
mation about the interests or the abilities
of the applicant, it is possible that the prin-
cipal will select the wrong agent to pur-
sue its goals and endure the opportunity
cost (i.e., adverse selection). If the prin-
cipal and the agent enter into an agree-
ment, the agent is offered an opportunity to
gain from specialization and the informa-
tional advantage that it provides, including
the conditional authority to act on behalf
of the principal, the concomitant financial
and professional rewards and some degree
of autonomy. The principal must in turn
relinquish valued resources and ensure that
they receive an adequate return on the
investment, in terms of productive labor
and output realization.
The central difficulty for principals dur-
ing the post-contract stage of the relation-
ship, as articulated by Arrow (1), is that
“by definition the agent has been selected
for his specialized knowledge and the prin-
cipal can never hope to completely check
the agent’s performance” (2). The prin-
cipal must thus bear the risk that the
agent will act definitely or in ways that
will have consequences for which it will
be liable (i.e., moral hazard). The prin-
cipal also has an incentive to minimize
the risk of the transaction by reducing
uncertainty and negative externalities (i.e.,
agency costs). This can be achieved via
the strategic introduction of information
revelation and generation mechanisms or
by offering the agent incentives based on
self-interest (such as pay by performance
or profit sharing schemes) to create better
alignment and ensure better communica-
tion and cooperation from the start (3, 4).
RULES OF THE GAME
As the principal in the relationship between
the scientists and the US government,
the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
retained the Erasmus MC Department of
Virology to conduct research in support of
the US Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) Pandemic Influenza Plan
(5). The terms of the contract between
the NIH and the Centers of Excellence
for Influenza Research and Surveillance
(CEIRS) are defined in the solicitation doc-
ument and include the provisions for all
grant recipients, including foreign institu-
tions, to comply with NIH policies and
relevant US regulations (6).
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The Erasmus MC Department of Virol-
ogy was selected to perform research within
the CEIRS network because the research
proposal defined a problem of mutual
interest, in scientific terms as well as in
terms that were consistent with the objec-
tives of pandemic preparedness1. In addi-
tion, Ron Fouchier is specialized in the
pathogenicity of respiratory viruses and
has an established publication record in
this particular domain of research exper-
tise, signaling to the scientific community
and funding agencies alike his competency
in virology. However, the decision to con-
duct research on the transmissibility of
avian influenza was not a decision that
followed directly from NIH funding but
had been under consideration at Erasmus
MC since the initial detection of the virus
in 1997 (7). It was thus against a back-
drop of scientific uncertainty and ques-
tions about an emerging virus that that
Fouchier defined his research questions
and the methods of experimentation (8).
Given some industry affiliations (including
patents), an interest in future commercial
applications can also be presumed2.
CONTROVERSY
At an influenza conference, Dr. Fouchier
announced that a “stupid” experiment suc-
ceeded in creating an airborne strain of the
virus and the result was “very bad news”
(9). The media had a field day with the
story about what was in his terms, “proba-
bly one of the most dangerous viruses you
can make” (10). It was soon revealed that
Fouchier had submitted a paper to Sci-
ence and intended to openly publish the
intricate details. The headlines that ensued
expressed strong reactions and objections
to the research and the publication, includ-
ing references from reputable biosecurity
experts (11).
Upon review by the US National Sci-
entific Advisory Board for Biosecurity
(NSABB), the HHS was advised to request
redacted versions of two manuscripts,
including the paper co-authored by Ron
Fouchier and a similar paper submitted
to Nature by Yoshihiro Kawaoka from
the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
According to an NIH Press Statement, the
board’s recommendations called for key
details to be removed to prevent the repli-
cation of the experiments “by those who
would seek to do harm” (12).
The Chair of the NSABB further clar-
ified that the recommendation was based
on the perception that the potential nega-
tive consequences of publishing the manu-
scripts outweighed the benefits. The inten-
tion, however, was neither to restrict the
dissemination of information to persons
with a legitimate need to know nor for
the US to dominate what was essentially
a global issue. Rather, the US govern-
ment was also considering a mechanism
to enable secured access and would pur-
sue “broad” discussions with “global lead-
ers” on matters of policy, science, and
public health (13). This point gave cre-
dence to concerns that the limitations
would interfere with scientific progress
and public health preparedness, partic-
ularly the recently established and hard
wrought Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
(PIP) Framework of the World Health
Organization (WHO).
The scientists connected to the con-
tentious studies and the Editor-in Chief of
both journals conceded to the request for
a redaction but on the condition that fur-
ther progress would be made on matters
of policy. The former imitated a “pause” on
H5N1 gain-of-function experiments to buy
time for scientists to communicate with the
public and policy-makers, for governments
to consider policy solutions and for the sci-
entific community to assemble and discuss
the issues in an international forum (14).
The latter indicated that it is next steps
would rest on the US government capacity
to share the omitted details (15).
At a “technical consultation” hosted by
the WHO in Geneva, it was decided by
consensus that the research was essential,
that the papers should be published with-
out restrictions, and that limiting access to
the research results was missing a practical
vision (16)3. The NSABB was thereafter
requested on behalf of the US govern-
ment to review two new manuscripts. Clar-
ifications provided by the authors and
“non-public data” discussed at the WHO
meeting were named as key factors influ-
encing the NSABB decision to revisit the
matter (17).
The NSABB concluded by a majority
rule that the publications should be “com-
municated in full” (18). The consideration
of new epidemiological data and classified
security information relevant to the risk-
benefit calculation and the release of a new
United States Government Policy for Over-
sight of Life Sciences Dual-Use Research of
Concern (DURC) informed the discussion
and influenced the decision. The morato-
rium, however, was upheld until the follow-
ing year as NIH funded scientist awaited
pending changes in the funding policy for
transmissibility studies (19).
DISCUSSION
Within constraints of science-policy, the
roles of the government and of science
are institutionally mediated (20). Govern-
ments are appointed to serve the interests
of the public and retain scientific informa-
tion to these ends. Scientists are delegated
with the authority to conduct specialized
research in pursuit of particular goals and
missions. The government is empowered
to dictate how the agent should act and
define the limits of autonomy. Scientists,
however, have an informational advantage
because they are on the front lines of
knowledge development and have other
motivations influencing their decisions.
The relationship manifests as a dynamic
series of moves taken by the principal and
the agent to protect their respective inter-
ests, beginning with the negotiation of the
contract4.
1The identification of mutations influencing influenza transmission can facilitate the development of medical countermeasures such diagnostics, vaccines, and drug
therapies.
2At the time the paper was submitted, Fouchier was a part-time employee, the Chief Scientific Officer (CSO) and a shareholder in ViroClinics Biosciences, a lab that
conducts virology research in support of clinical trials, diagnostics, and medical treatments. Conflicts of interest in this case, however, were avoided by letting the shares to
the Stichting Administratiekantoor Erasmus Personeelsparticipaties (a financial institution established to hold shares for Erasmus University staff).
3According to the report, “the group recognized the difficulty of rapidly creating and regulating such a mechanism in light of the complexity of international and national
legislation,” and thus decided that it was not viable.
4In scholarly discussions about the dynamics of science-policy, this process is referred to as “boundary-work” and serves to stabilize the boundary between science and
politics.
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The contract between the NIH and Ron
Fouchier aligned their interests on pan-
demic preparedness. However, different
preferences about how the research results
should be communicated combined with
insufficient incentives from the govern-
ment can be perceived as creating a moral
hazard. Fouchier’s colorful description of
his research and outspoken views on open-
ness in science landed him in the political
hot seat but the risk was not borne by
him. Rather, it is in the interest of sci-
entists to increase their visibility within
the research community and to publish in
prestigious journals because science com-
munication facilitates research progress
and because it can improve their career
prospects.
Had the NIH thoroughly considered the
objectives of the research methods and the
implications in relation to existing dual-use
concerns or had Fouchier been compelled
to be more explicit about the potential out-
comes, the controversy and at least some of
the agency costs could have been mitigated.
The agency costs include the research
delayed by the extension of the mora-
torium, the drafting of comprehensive
changes in government policies and the
implementation and performance thereof.
The consequences of the monitoring and
new bureaucratic rules, however, will also
be felt by the scientists engaged in this type
of research.
While not a typical adverse selection
problem, the international dimension
to this problem raises questions about
the relationship between principals and
foreign agents and whether discrepan-
cies between national dual-use policies
and legal requirements will impact future
funding decisions.
The Netherlands for instance requested
an export license for Fouchier’s manu-
script, which delayed the publication and
complicated the redaction option (21). In
addition, the new US government poli-
cies introduced selection mechanisms
that exclude certain research projects,
including those that cannot be openly
communicated or conducted in civilian
(non-classified) research laboratories. The
review and oversight procedures may also
provide a disincentive for scientists to pur-
sue particular research projects or seek
certain funding opportunities. This may
impact the international marketplace for
research grants. Ron Fouchier for instance
has claimed that he “would not be silenced
by the Americans anymore,” and has con-
tinued his studies using funding from the
European Union (22).
We propose that exploring the com-
plex entanglement of decisions taken by
the many principals and agents in this
case, including those on the international
level such as the WHO, can provide fur-
ther insight into the tensions between
scientists and policy-makers and indicate
what can be done to help all parties
involved to achieve their goals. The ana-
lytical framework can also help alleviate
conflicts and prevent similar problems. For
instance, if principals and agents have non-
aligned interests, and a stand-off may pre-
vail instead of progress. In addition, when
incentives are strong, there is essentially
no need for monitoring, which can be an
ineffective mechanism if it excessive con-
straint are placed on the agent (23). These
issues have worked to the detriment of
the relationship between the principal and
the agent in the H5N1 case and of the
general public, which may have lost con-
fidence in the institutions involved. This
may well have been avoided if a more
meaningful negotiation process was pur-
sued or boundary spanning mechanisms
were developed to bridge the asymmetry of
information, which can improve trust and
transparency and increase the possibility of
interest mediation (20).
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